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ON THE VALUE OF FREEDOM TO DO EVIL
Joshua Rasmussen

Theists typically think the freedom to choose between right and wrong is a
great good (hence, the free will defense). Yet, they also typically think that the
very best being—God—and inhabitants of the very best place—heaven—lack
this kind of freedom. The question arises: if freedom to choose evil is so good,
then why is it absent from the best being and the best place? I discuss articulations of this question in the literature and point out drawbacks of answers
that have been proposed. I then propose a new answer by showing how freedom to do evil could result in certain good situations even if it does not contribute to the intrinsic greatness of a certain being or place.

1. Introduction
Wes Morriston argues that moral freedom—the freedom to do evil—
cannot be good if the best possible being lacks it.1 And Yujin Nagasawa
et al. argue that moral freedom cannot be good if beings in heaven lack
it.2 These arguments pose a serious challenge for theists who think that
moral freedom is worth having despite the evil that may result from it (in
view of the free will defense). Theists typically think that the very best being
(God) and the very best place (heaven) are devoid of moral freedom: the
best being cannot do evil, and the best place cannot contain evil. These
thoughts result in a puzzle. How can moral freedom be good or valuable
if it is absent from the best being and best place? And even if there is no best
possible being, one might think that if there were such a being, it would
be essentially perfect and so lack moral freedom. So, why should anyone
value this kind of freedom?
I will propose a new answer. But first, I will discuss the arguments expressed by Morriston, Nagasawa, et al. to draw out instances of what I call
“the Problem of Moral Freedom.”

1
Wes Morriston, “What’s So Good About Moral Freedom?,” The Philosophical Quarterly
50:3 (2000), 344–358, and “Is God Free? A Reply to Wierenga,” Faith and Philosophy 23:1
(2006), 93–98. Cf. Quentin Smith, Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytic Philosophy of Language (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 148–157.
2
Yujin Nagasawa, Graham Oppy, and Nick Trakakis, “Salvation in Heaven?,” Philosophical
Papers 33:1 (2004), 97–119.
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2. Morriston’s Dilemma
Morriston presents the following dilemma: either a maximally great being
would have moral freedom, or else moral freedom does not contribute
to one’s greatness. The first horn, which implies that God can do evil,
contradicts classical theism. The second calls into question the value of
having the freedom to do evil: why would moral freedom be valuable
if a maximally great being would lack it? This dilemma targets classical
theists who think that moral freedom has some value.3
Morriston considers whether moral freedom might be valuable for creatures but not for God.4 Perhaps if God creates Ted with an essentially morally perfect nature, then Ted cannot be properly praised for doing good.
Consider that Ted’s actions would be good rather than bad only because
of God’s decision to make Ted perfect. It seems, then, that Ted is not the
ultimate source of the fact that any of his actions are good. And perhaps one
must be the ultimate source of a fact to be ultimately responsible for that
fact. Thus, perhaps Ted cannot be responsible, and so properly praised, for
his good actions precisely because he is not the ultimate source of them,
and perhaps he is not the ultimate source of them precisely because he
was created perfect. Morriston considers whether things might be different
with uncreated beings. Since no one created God to be perfect, God can be
the ultimate source of His actions—and so be properly praised for them.
Thus, perhaps God, unlike created beings, can be morally praiseworthy
without having the freedom to do evil.
Morriston does not think this suggestion provides a way out of his dilemma, however. He emphasizes that essentially morally perfect beings,
whether created or not, would be determined by their natures to act in a
certain way, and he suggests that they would therefore be equally praiseworthy (or not praiseworthy) for their actions. For suppose Ned is an
essentially morally perfect being that pops into existence uncaused, and
suppose Ted is an essentially morally perfect being that is created. Notice that both Ned and Ted lack control over what essential natures they
happen to have: they are both stuck being essentially morally perfect. But
then it may be counterintuitive to suppose that the uncreated Ned alone
is praiseworthy for his actions. Ned and Ted, alike, lack control over their

3
Non-traditional theists who think, for example, that moral freedom is essential to being a
morally responsible agent may resist the dilemma on the grounds that the best being would
indeed have moral freedom. And, of course, theological determinists who place no stock in
the free will defense (which emphasizes the value of moral freedom) will not be troubled by
the dilemma. The intent of this paper is to see if classical theists who value moral freedom
might have a way out, too.
4
This idea is expressed by Edward Wierenga, “The Freedom of God,” Faith and Philosophy
19:4 (2002), 425–436 and Alexander Pruss, “The Essential Divine Perfection Objection to the
Free Will Defense,” Religious Studies 44:4 (2008), 433–434. Cf. Sandra Visser and Thomas Williams, Anselm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 173–185. Morriston, “What’s so Good
about Moral Freedom?” 50–52, thinks the best unsuccessful reply to his dilemma is based
upon this very idea.
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natures, and thus it seems that they are equally responsible (or not responsible) for the predetermined consequences of their natures.
I am sympathetic with Morriston’s critique. Beings that are essentially
morally perfect have a nature they did not choose to have, and potentially
praiseworthy actions deterministically (and non-causally) flow from that
very nature. It is not clear, then, why we should praise such beings or
why we should praise them only if they happen to be uncaused. It is still
perplexing: why should moral freedom be valuable for creatures but not
for God?5
Answers are scarce.6 Alexander Pruss suggests an answer based upon
the doctrine of divine simplicity.7 The idea is that if God alone is his nature,
then we may give the following explanation as to why moral freedom
is valuable for creatures but not for God: creatures that are essentially
perfect are not praiseworthy since their essential natures stand prior to
them in the sequence of explanation (i.e., they do good only because they
are by nature good), whereas God is praiseworthy because God and his
nature stand as one and the same starting point in the sequence of explanation. Yet, one may doubt that a difference in explanatory starting
points is relevant: after all, whether an individual is identical to its nature
or not, it still lacks control over what essential nature it has (or is) and
so would seem to lack control over what actions deterministically flow
from its nature; why, then, should we praise a being that happens to be
an essentially perfect nature but not one that happens to have an essentially perfect nature?8 Moreover, many philosophers of religion find it
implausible that God should be identical to his nature. So, I would like
to explore whether a solution can be given that is not wedded to divine
simplicity.
A different solution involves accepting the first horn and supposing
that a maximally great being actually can do evil, though never would.9
This view has a significant drawback, however: it leaves unexplained why
all the actions of a morally perfect being happen to be good all the time. It
seems quite unlikely, a priori, that a being would always do what’s right if
it is genuinely possible for that being to do evil at every turn. What, then,
might explain why God always succeeds in making the right choice? R.
Zachary Manis suggests that God’s good character could provide a non5
For an elaboration and defense of this criticism, see Morriston, “What’s So Good about
Moral Freedom?” 350–352. See also Morriston, “Is God Free?”
6
The most common answer given is the one just critiqued.
7
Alexander Pruss, “A New Free Will Defense,” Religious Studies 39:2 (2003), 211–223.
8
Tom Flint drew my attention to this possible reply, which, as he suggested, may appeal
to someone who is convinced by the Ned and Ted example that the origin of one’s nature is
not relevant to one’s praiseworthiness.
9
See R. Zachary Manis, “Could God Do Something Evil? A Molinist Solution to the
Problem of Divine Freedom,” Faith and Philosophy 28:2 (2011), 209–223 for a defense of this
view. See also Theodore Guleserian, “Divine Freedom and the Problem of Evil,” Faith and
Philosophy 17:3 (2000), 348–366.
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deterministic explanation of God’s good actions.10 But even so, the fact
that God never performs (and would never perform) a wrong action seems
extraordinarily unlikely if God’s character does indeed permit wrong actions. It seems vastly more likely that God would always act perfectly if
God were essentially perfect than if God were not; and this probability
difference lends credence to the traditional view that a maximally great
God would be essentially perfect.
Moreover, even if a non-traditional view of God’s goodness is sustainable, the task of this paper is to see if a solution to the Problem of Moral
Freedom could be found that does not require abandoning the traditional
view (even if just for the sake of argument). So far, I have not found a
satisfying solution in the literature.11
3. The Problem of Heaven
We may state the Problem of Moral Freedom with respect to heaven as
follows:
1) Heaven is essentially devoid of evil.
2) If heaven is essentially devoid of evil, then no one has moral freedom in heaven.
3) Therefore, no one has moral freedom in heaven. (1, 2)
4) Heaven is the best place (realizes the greatest goods).
5) If heaven is the best place and no one has moral freedom there, then
having moral freedom is not valuable (at any time).
6) Therefore, having moral freedom is not valuable (at any time).12
(3–5)
Premises (1) and (4) fall out of a traditional understanding of heaven that
many theists accept.13 Premise (1) says that, necessarily, heaven contains
Manis, “Could God Do Something Evil?” 220.
Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 166, has
proposed in a footnote a solution which one may find partially satisfying. He suggests that
beings that are finite in knowledge cannot be essentially morally perfect, since they won’t
always know which action is morally right. I say this proposal is at best only partially satisfying since it doesn’t provide an account for why human beings should have moral freedom
to perform actions that they know to be bad. It can only account for why human beings are
able to commit sins of ignorance. A free-will defense, for example, that accounts only for
sins done out of ignorance is rather shabby: it clearly doesn’t do the work that theists have
traditionally wanted it to do. Moreover, we may wonder what’s so valuable about having
a merely finite amount of knowledge (or of being human, if finite knowledge is essential
to human nature), especially considering that a maximally great being would have infinite
knowledge. The supposition that moral freedom implies finite knowledge doesn’t by itself
explain why moral freedom is valuable.
12
Cf. Nagasawa, et al., “Salvation in Heaven?” 103–104.
13
It is also a common view that a third of the angels were kicked out of heaven (cf. Revelation 12:3–9), and one might wonder if that view implies that angels can do evil in heaven
(before getting kicked out). Nevertheless, I am restricting our focus to evil done by humans,
10
11
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no evil. Premise (4) adds that heaven realizes the best kinds of goods: for
example, it contains perfect love among creatures and their Creator. (Some
philosophers may prefer an alternative view of heaven, but I will assume
the view of heaven expressed by (1) if only because it is the view on which
the Problem of Moral Freedom is most challenging.14)
Premise (2) is justified by the definition of “moral freedom.” Suppose I
have moral freedom in a circumstance C. Then it is possible for me to be in
C and do evil.15 Therefore, if I have moral freedom in a heavenly circumstance, then it is possible for me to be in a heavenly circumstance—i.e., in
heaven—and do evil.16 So, if I cannot do evil in heaven, then I do not have
moral freedom there.
That leaves premise (5): if heaven is the best place and no one has moral
freedom there, then having moral freedom is not valuable (at any time).
This premise may sound reasonable if we assume that the very highest
goods and the very best relationships (in heaven) are devoid of moral
freedom. It is hard to see what good moral freedom might contribute if it
doesn’t contribute to the best relationships in the best place.
I believe a successful reply will involve motivating the following claim:
1) At least some of the goods in heaven depend for their existence on
there being persons who had moral freedom.
Suppose some goods in heaven depend upon persons having had moral
freedom. Then (5)—which says that if heaven is the best place and no one
has [present tense] moral freedom there, then having moral freedom is not
valuable (at any time)—is certainly false, and so the argument fails. For,
since my understanding is that the traditional view is that humans will not be able to do evil
in heaven. At least, this is a view that many theists appear to accept.
14
Just so it is clear, my goal is not to defend the claim that heaven is the best place. My
goal, rather, is to explain why there is no serious view of heaven that entails that moral
freedom has no value.
15
Morriston assumes that freedom to do X implies the possibility of doing X, since this
assumption undergirds the free will defense. I join Morriston in working with this assumption if only because it is what generates the problem. But see Steven Cowan, “Compatibilism
and the Sinlessness of the Redeemed in Heaven,” Faith and Philosophy 28:4 (2011), 416–432,
for a discussion of why one might abandon this assumption in order to avoid the problem.
16
I am assuming that no one could do evil in heaven, not merely that no one would. If we
suppose instead that people could do evil in heaven but nonetheless never would, then we
exacerbate the problem posed by heaven: for if God can actualize a place in which everyone
would consistently chose rightly, then one wonders why God couldn’t or didn’t actualize
such a place from the start. Cf. Nagasawa, et al., “Salvation in Heaven?” 106–108. Of course,
it may be logically possible that God creates someone who would choose wrongly prior to
entering heaven and who would then consistently choose rightly forever and ever. The difficulty, however, is in seeing why God could not also find any number of possible humans
who would consistently do right forever from the start. It may be possible that the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom prohibit this, but the question is whether this is at all probable. Cf. Josh Rasmussen, “On Creating Worlds without Evil—Given Divine Counterfactual
Knowledge,” Religious Studies 40:4 (2004), 457–470. Perhaps this difficulty can ultimately be
overcome, but I prefer to see if there might be a solution to the Problem of Moral Freedom
that is not wedded to a particular, controversial view of the counterfactuals of creaturely
freedom.
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according to (7), the value of moral freedom (at some time) consists in the
heavenly goods it reaps later on.
Is there a way to motivate (7)? The most promising motivation I have
encountered comes from James Sennett.17 Sennett suggests that among the
goods in heaven are free actions, and that these actions count as “free”
by virtue of being determined by a moral character that was itself freely
chosen. To illustrate, imagine that a creature, Jerry, can choose between
right and wrong; he has moral freedom. He sometimes chooses wrong, but
he repents and struggles to develop a good moral character. Perhaps he
even requests God’s help in this process. Eventually Jerry achieves a moral
character (either in this life or the next) that prevents him from performing
evil actions in heavenly circumstances. According to Sennett, Jerry’s actions still count as “free” in heaven because they flow from a freely chosen
character. Perhaps, then, creatures in heaven who had moral freedom can
enjoy the benefit of performing “free” actions even while they no longer
have the capacity to do evil. The value of moral freedom would then be
this: it enables an eternity of “free” actions that are all good.
Unfortunately, there are a couple of reasons to doubt that Sennett’s
suggestion constitutes an adequate solution to the Problem of Moral
Freedom. First, it falls prey to Morriston’s dilemma. Recall the dilemma:
either a maximally great being has moral freedom, which is incompatible
with classical theism, or moral freedom is not a great-making property.
Sennett’s suggestion effectively blocks any way of going between the
horns, for it implies that actions that flow from a freely chosen nature are
superior to actions that flow from a nature that is not freely chosen. But
now it looks as though our actions have a great-making feature that God’s
actions must lack, since God’s nature was not freely chosen. The challenge,
then, is to explain why the actions of a maximally great being should lack
this particular great-making feature of creaturely actions. That challenge
remains to be met.18
Nagasawa, et al., raise further objections to Sennett’s proposal.19 Here
is just one (in my own terms). Suppose that Jerry freely chooses a morally good character and then God makes an intrinsic duplicate of Jerry.
17
James Sennett, “Is there Freedom in Heaven?,” Faith and Philosophy 16:1 (1999), 69–82.
Tim Pawl and Kevin Timpe, “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” Faith and
Philosophy 26:4 (2009), 398–419, build upon Sennett’s proposal but emphasize the value of
freedom in heaven to choose among goods.
18
This same objection poses a problem for the solution given by Pawl and Timpe in “Incompatibilism, Sin, and Free Will in Heaven,” since they, like Sennett, think there is a kind
of genuine freedom that citizens of heaven enjoy that excludes the ability to sin. They even
say (more recently), “we see no reason why one should value freedom-plus-ability-to-sin
over freedom-minus-ability-to-sin.” See Pawl and Timpe, “Heavenly Freedom: A Reply to
Cowan,” Faith and Philosophy (forthcoming). But if freedom-minus-ability-to-sin is just as
valuable as freedom-plus-ability-to-sin, then we are back to wondering why freedom-plusability-to-sin should ever be preferred. We have not escaped Morriston’s dilemma (which,
incidentally, Pawl and Timpe do not address). Cf. Cowan, “Compatibilism and the Sinlessness of the Redeemed,” 428–429.
19
Nagasawa, Oppy, and Trakakis, “Salvation in Heaven?” 110–113.
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Both Jerry and his duplicate may now enjoy perfect love and fellowship
with God and others forever, for they are intrinsically exactly alike. Oddly,
Sennett’s proposal entails that Jerry, but not his duplicate, performs free
actions (or at least actions that are as valuable as free actions) in heaven.
Nagasawa, et al., suggest that this result is highly implausible; it’s implausible, they say, that Jerry’s actions would be free and valuable while the
intrinsically similar loving actions of his duplicate would not be. For this
reason, they reject Sennett’s proposal.
I don’t claim that the problems just discussed are decisive, or that no
one will think of replies to them.20 My point is just that Sennett’s solution
leads to questions that have yet to be addressed at this stage in the dialectic. The Problem of Moral Freedom remains unsolved.
At this point, someone might reply in the spirit of skeptical theism that
we simply are not in a position to know what value moral freedom contributes for creatures. This reply suggests that we can simply live with a
puzzle; that is, we can rationally affirm the value of moral freedom without
having any idea how moral freedom could be valuable while absent from
the best place and the best being.
However, this paper is not concerned with questions about what’s rational to believe. The goal of this essay is to make headway in actually
solving the Problem of Moral Freedom. And that’s what I propose to do
next.
4. A Value of Moral Freedom
The question on the table is this: why is moral freedom valuable if the best
place and the best being lack it? So far, we have considered the alleged
value of moral freedom for creatures. A creature is supposedly better off
if that creature has moral freedom. But perhaps moral freedom is good
not primarily because it contributes to the value or quality of a being, but
rather because it contributes to the value or quality of certain situations
that involve free actions. To explain what I mean, consider the following
two stories:
(Forced-Love) Sally loves daffodils, and her husband, Sam, knows this.
Rather than wait to see if Sam will decide to buy her daffodils, Sally discreetly pours a love potion into Sam’s soup. After Sam eats his soup, the
potion deterministically causes him to form a desire sufficiently strong
so as to causally determine that Sam expresses love to Sally by surprising
her with a vase full of daffodils. As a result, Sam does exactly that.

20
Jerry Walls suggested to me (via e-mail, July 1st, 2012) the following reply to this last
problem. Observe that unlike Jerry’s duplicate, Jerry would have (veridical) memories of
how his character was formed by his previous choices; furthermore, Jerry’s firm resolve to
resist sin and choose the good in heaven would no doubt be motivated by memories of the
misery of choosing sin and the hurtful consequences. Hence, moral freedom could bring
the following good: a motivation to act rightly based upon truthful memories of how one’s
character was freely developed.
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(Unforced-Love) Sally loves daffodils, and her husband, Sam, knows
this. One day, Sam decides, of his own accord, to express love to Sally
by surprising her with a vase full of daffodils.
Now ask yourself, which situation is better? Surely it is (Unforced-Love).
In it, Sam expresses love toward Sally of his own accord; Sally does not
cause him to do so. By contrast, in (Forced-Love), Sally causally determines Sam’s act of love toward her. The fact that Sally herself is the one
who kicks off the sequence of events that causally determines Sam’s act of
love seems to detract from the goodness of the situation.
It seems that (Unforced-Love) would still be better than (Forced-Love),
even if Sam would have inevitably given Sally daffodils of his own accord. Note that what makes (Unforced-Love) better may not merely be that
it features an action that is free (in the libertarian sense). I suggest that a
value arises from the fact that someone gets to be loved without that very
person having to resort to determining the very loving act directed toward
him.21 True, Sally’s existence and attributes may play a role in Sam’s decision; what’s important, however, is that the role they play is not causally determining. I suggest, therefore, that one important reason (Unforced-Love)
seems better than (Forced-Love) is this: only in (Unforced-Love) does
someone benefit from an act of love without causally determining that very
act. (There may be additional reasons, too.) Therefore, I propose that
(L) A situation in which an agent x makes some agent y express love
toward x lacks a certain value that’s included in a situation in which
x is the recipient of an expression of love by y without x making y
express love to x,
where I stipulate that
“x makes y do z” =def “x performs an action A that is part of a causal
chain resulting in a state of the world22 that (i) necessarily implies
that y does z at some time, and (ii) obtains independently of any
prior intention of y to do z.”23
21
Thus, we do not commit ourselves to the controversial thesis that a freely chosen expression of love is automatically more valuable than an inevitable or psychologically determined
expression of love. For a critical discussion of this controversial thesis, see Kenneth Eimar
Himma, “The Free-Will Defence: Evil and the Moral Value of Free Will,” Religious Studies
45:4 (2009), 400–403.
22
A “state of the world” is a proposition that describes what is the case at some time
without also specifying what will be the case or what was the case from the perspective of
that time. A state of the world also doesn’t include any counterfactuals of freedom or divine
foreknowledge.
23
This second clause is added to rule out a scenario like the following. Sam decides of
his own accord to get Sally daffodils. But he cannot get them without the car keys in Sally’s
purse. So, Sam asks Sally for the keys (without telling her his plan), and Sally hands him
the keys. As it happens, Sally’s handing the keys to Sam results in a state of the world—one
that includes Sam’s previously formed intention to get daffodils for Sally—that entails that
Sam gets daffodils for Sally. (Imagine that Sam’s decision is firm and beyond the point of
no return, and that everything else relevant to the scenario now proceeds deterministi-
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Before I continue, notice that (L) focuses on just one value. There might
well be counterbalancing values. For example, a theological determinist
could think that divine providence—of the sort that requires causal determinism—is of such great value that our world is better off in total if
everyone’s acts of love toward God are causally determined by God. Or,
one could argue that the value in (L) is too miniscule to be worth allowing
evil choices (be they few or many) for the sake of it.24 My goal is to explain
how moral freedom could contribute some value to our world despite not
contributing to the value of the best place or the best being.
Let us continue. I will now explain why if (L) is true, then moral freedom
can contribute value to our world. If (L) is true, then a situation in which
God makes people express love toward Him (through causal determination) would lack a certain value that is had by a situation in which people
express love toward God of their own accord (that is, without God making
them do so). We might expect that God would want to receive love from
his creatures without being the determining cause of that love. Thus, to
permit the desired love from His creatures, God must not make His creatures love Him, which in turn implies that God cannot simply make his
creatures essentially morally perfect; they must be morally free if God and
his creatures are to enjoy unforced love. Therefore, moral freedom has
this value: it allows there to be a situation in which a being, such as God,
is the object of loving acts without causally determining those very acts.
(Notice that there is no analogous reason to think that God’s having moral
freedom would be good: even without having moral freedom, God loves
his creatures without those creatures making Him do so.25)
This solution to Morriston’s dilemma differs from the solution we considered earlier. There it was suggested that moral freedom allows creatures to be morally praiseworthy for their actions. The problem, recall, is
that there does not appear to be a principled reason to think that moral
praise requires moral freedom for creatures but not for uncreated beings,
like God. The solution I offer does not face that problem since I do not
say that moral freedom is required for moral praise. Nor do I even say
that moral freedom contributes to the value or quality of a being that has
it; perhaps creatures would actually be better (or greater) if they were
essentially morally perfect. What I say instead is that moral freedom in
cally). This case is certainly more like (Unforced-Love) than (Forced-Love) because in this
case, as in (Unforced-Love), Sally does not “make” Sam do anything he was not already
intent on doing. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for raising an objection that led me
to recognize the value of adding this second clause.
24
For a recent discussion of whether moral freedom has sufficient value for a theodicy, see
Himma, “Plantinga’s Version of the Free-Will Argument: The Good and Evil that Free Beings
Do,” Religious Studies 46:1 (2010), 21–39.
25
If it were good for God to be morally free, it would not be good in the sense of contributing to God’s greatness, on the assumption that maximal greatness entails essential
moral goodness. If, on the other hand, moral freedom is said to be compatible with maximal
greatness (contra classical theism), then Morriston’s dilemma loses its force because moral
freedom is then admitted to be a great-making feature.
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creatures may be required for the obtaining of certain good situations—
namely, situations in which people love God without God making them
do so.26 (I should stress that it is consistent with my account to say that
creatures are “greater” in the sense that they can enter into a better kind of
relationship with their creator.)
So moral freedom does not contribute to the greatness of the best being
because it does not contribute to the greatness of any being. It does, however, enable some valuable kinds of loving situations, and that’s what
could be valuable about it.
It is worth pointing out that my solution leaves open the question of
what makes a situation valuable. You might think, for instance, that the
value of a loving situation derives in part from the value of the actions
within that situation. In that case, what makes (Unforced-Love) better is
that it features a better kind of action—one that is directed toward a person
who doesn’t causally determine that very action. Note that nothing in this
account implies that only creatures are capable of performing such actions;
even God, who, let’s say, must love all persons, would not be causally determined by anyone to do so. My solution, then, allows for the possibility
that moral freedom contributes to the value of certain actions.
What about the best place? Why isn’t it populated with people who have
moral freedom? We now have the materials for an answer. To start, recall
that moral freedom enables situations in which people love God without
God making them do so. Moral freedom can also lead to situations in which
people freely overcome various evils or in which God extends forgiveness
and redemption. (Again, that is not to say that some or all the resulting
evils are worth it—only that there is value here.) So moral freedom has
value—at least for a while. But situations involving moral freedom might
eventually give way to a better situation: a situation in which people continually enjoy perfect, unforced love and fellowship with each other and
with their Creator.
Why wouldn’t God set up an essentially evil-free place from the beginning? Perhaps it is because doing so has this cost: it entails that God makes
people love Him. Perhaps it is better for God to give people the freedom to
choose to love Him—by enabling them to develop moral characters from
which an everlasting love may eventually spring forth. Then people could
continually love God forever without ever being made by God to do so.
In that case, moral freedom would have value even though the best place
would lack it.
I should emphasize that the above proposal is compatible with a variety of views about the after-life. For instance, one could think that many
people (if not all) undergo an extended stage of post-mortem transformation involving free choices before entering heaven (but after death). On this
26
The ideas behind this solution are similar to ideas expressed by John Hick, Evil and the
God of Love, rev. ed. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1978), 274–275, though his ideas are given
in relation to a different problem from the one Morriston raises.
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view, humans achieve a morally perfect (“sinless”) character (by freely
cooperating with God’s grace, perhaps) in a “purgatory” state prior to
heaven.27 Or a Molinist could think that creatures are morally free and consistently choose rightly during an early stage of heaven.28 The idea here is
that with some divine counterfactual planning, heaven could be arranged
so that people finish the work of achieving a morally perfect character
in heaven without ever doing evil there.29 Or, one might think that God
perfects our characters at some time (either before or after physical death)
in response to our freely asking him to help us become morally upright. In
that case, our particular acts of love toward God would meet the conditions of (Unforced-Love), since God makes us upright only because of our
initial choice to pursue moral uprightness of our own accord. Other views
may work, too.
My proposal is certainly related to Sennett’s proposal. For like Sennett’s,
mine implies that heaven is better if the people there had moral freedom.
Unlike Sennett’s proposal, however, mine does not imply that morally
significant actions in heaven have a great-making feature that God’s actions lack. I say rather that certain valuable situations depend upon moral
freedom. Also, I do not require that beings in heaven perform free actions
(or that they don’t). As a result, my answer is not susceptible to the same
criticisms as Sennett’s.
I offer the above solution to the Problem of Moral Freedom as a working
hypothesis. I do not claim to have the last word; my solution may open
up further inquiries. What’s important is that the solution advances our
understanding of moral freedom, for it provides a new explanation as to
how freedom to act badly could be valuable despite its absence from the
best possible being and the best place.30
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